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RESPONDENTS AND 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs sued the defendants for landscape 
architect's services and landscape construction per-
formed by plaintiffs for the defendants Margaret 
Morton, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen on cer-
tain property at Summit Park, Utah, asking that 
a lien be determined to exist on the improved prop-
erty in favor of plaintiffs and praying for fore-
dosure of said lien. Defendants answered denying 
liai.'ility, disputing the charges and alleging the 
woJ'k was not complete and counter-claimed for 
$4,000 for damages to their property. The court in 
its pretrial order of November 3, 1965, held that 
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under the pleadings as they then appeared the 
plaintiffs, upon proper proof, could obtain a per-
sonal judgment against D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. 
Skeen in addition to foreclosure of a mechanic's 
lien. (R-21) In the defendants' statement of the 
case they have entirely neglected the aspect of the 
personal judgment entered against the defendants 
and have proceeded in their brief on the sole ques-
tion as to whether the claim of plaintiffs is se-
cured by a valid mechanic's lien. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The jury in the trial court brought in a verdict 
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants de-
termining that plaintiff Leon Frehner had per-
formed work as a landscape architect for defen-
dants reasonably worth the sum of $156.25, and 
that all of said work was secured by a mechanic's 
lien; that plaintiff Minnie C. Frehner dba Frehner 
Mountain West Gardens had performed work for 
defendants of the reasonable value of $1,105.94, 
that $808.45 of said work was secured by a me-
chanic's lien, and that plaintiffs' counsel was en-
titled to $750.00 attorney's fees. The court had 
directed a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the 
question of the liability of the defendants, D. A. 
Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, for the fair and reas-
onable value of the labor, materials and professional 
services leaving to the jury the question of the 
amount. It also directed a verdict determining that 
a valid lien existed in favor of plaintiffs against the 
property of D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen again 
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leaving the amount of the lien to be determined by 
the jury. It also directed a verdict determining the 
priority of plaintiffs' lien over the first trust deed 
of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association 
and against defendants, Skeens, on their counter-
claim, no cause of action. See trial court's notation 
on plaintiffs' requested Instruction #3 (R. 51). At 
the hearing on defendants' motion for a new trial, 
the court required plaintiffs' counsel to reduce his 
attorney's fee from $750.00 to $509.32 (one-half the 
total claim supported by a lien.) ( R. 87). Plain-
tiffs' counsel did so under objection by interlineation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek reversal of the verdict and 
the judgment on the verdict, or a new trial. Plain-
tiffs seek affirmance of the judgment on the verdict 
and by cross-appeal seek reinstatement of the at-
torney's fee awarded by the jury of $750.00 and an 
additional attorney's fee for this appeal in the sum 
of $500.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in defendants' brief en-
tirely omits the facts on which the court found the 
agency of Margaret Morton to act for the Skeens 
and, therefore, considerable detail is added here. 
Defendants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, pur-
chased property at Summit Park, Utah, described 
as Lot 48, Summit Park, Plat "C" and prior to con-
struction of any building thereon made arrange-
ments with their daughter, Margaret Morton, 
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whereby she might live on the premises with her 
two children until such time as the Skeens desired 
occupancy or felt to sell (Tr. 243). Margaret Mor-
ton desired to be the purchaser at any such sale. 
(Tr. 238). The arrangements contemplated that 
Margaret would pay the $185.00 per month mort-
gage payment to Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association (Tr. 244), and that if the Skeens de-
termined to occupy the property or to sell to some-
one else, and Margaret had built up an equity, she 
would be credited with such equity and reimbursed 
(Tr. 256). 
Margaret had obtained a set of plans from Bet-
ter Homes and Gardens which were closely followed 
in the construction of the home, utilizing a general 
contractor, Jess Brewer, of Salt Lake City (Tr. 238). 
Margaret was told by defendant, D. A. Skeen, "to 
take complete charge and follow the plans," (Tr. 
243) as modified by any requests of the general 
contractor, which modifications were subject to Mr. 
Skeen's approval. Margaret was to be called in to 
see "if she would be willing to make the change in 
the plans" (Tr. 240). Prior to commencement of 
construction, discussion was had between Mr. Skeen 
and Mrs. Mqrton regarding landscape gardening 
(Tr. 246). Mr. Skeen stated that he attempted to 
1diseourage his daughter from dealing with the 
plaintiffs since he had had "a very unfortunate 
experience with him (Frehner) at one time" (Tr. 
246). Margaret, nevertheless, told her father that 
"she wanted the job done right and wanted to talk 
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with Frehner" (Tr. 248). Margaret went ahead and 
made arrangements with the Frehners (Tr. 249) 
for detailed studies of the mountain home and the 
landscape construction which was to be done by 
Mrs. Frehner' s firm "Frehner Mountain West Gar-
dens." Mr. Skeen learned that his daughter had con-
tacted Frehner, (Tr. 248, 249) but did not interfere 
with her choice of the landscaper, stating "If that 
is your decision, Margaret, I want to have you 
happy" (Tr. 248). Skeen agreed that he would pro-
vide money for the building and "if the landscaping 
is not included in that (the construction loan) I will 
have to get the money on the side" (Tr. 249, 262, 
263). 
Mr. Skeen was on the property on several occa-
sions during construction (Tr. 240) but denied that 
he observed the progress of the landscape work 
(Tr. 241-A) (Tr. 249). He admitted that he "knew 
she was doing something," but had never been on 
the ground to inspect it (Tr. 253). He was told by 
the general contractor, Brewer, about the time Mr. 
Frehner started the job (Tr. 138) that "Frehner 
has been up that way, and he is going to make this 
cost you three times what it should cost" (Tr. 259). 
He also was told by Brewer that the pond "will cost 
some money. I don't know how much" (Tr. 259). 
Skeen indicated the landscaping was not frequently 
discussed in the Skeen home because "Margaret in-
tended to complete the thing and give me a surprise" 
(Tr. 260). Brewer had told Skeen "Margaret is 
enthusiastic over it, but don't let her know that I 
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told this to you" (Tr. 262). Eleanor, another daugh-
ter, is represented by Skeen as saying, "I am afraid 
that fellow Frehner has imposed upon Margaret 
and you have to pay for it" (Tr. 263). Despite all 
these "warnings" Mr. Skeen did nothing, not even 
voicing an objection (Tr. 138), explaining his in-
action by stating that "he recognized how sensitive 
Margaret was and didn't want to hurt her feelings 
by criticizing her judgment" (Tr. 264). There was 
some discussion between Margaret and her father 
with reference to her father drawing a written con-
tract for the landscaping. Skeen knew at the time 
that Frehners were the landscapers involved (Tr. 
264). Such a contract was never prepared and Mr. 
Frehner proceeded under the oral arrangement 
assuming the property was Margaret's and that she 
had the right to order the improvements. 
The landscape work was completed in early 
December of 1964 and plaintiffs' bills under date 
of December 1, 1964, and January 1, 1965 (See plain-
tiffs' Exhibits #1, #8 and #9) were submitted to 
Mrs. Morton. Mr. Brewer received the bills from 
Mrs. Morton and presented them to Mr. Skeen who 
made no attempt to pay them. It was evident at this 
time that the·money had run out and that the con-
struction of the mountain home had far exceeded 
the estimates of the parties. The final cost was 
"close to $40,000" (Tr. 109). A loan for $22,000 
had been taken with Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan which had been increased to $24,200 (Tr. 105) 
and Mr. Skeen had determined to pay the balance 
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(approximately $15,800) from his own funds (Tr. 
117.) 
Mr. Skeen stated that he considered his daugh-
ter extravagant (Tr. 250, 251) and that he in-
tended, after covering the added expenses incurred 
in connection with the construction that Margaret 
would pay him back when her situation permitted. 
(Tr. 265) The exchange between plaintiff's counsel 
and Skeen occurred as follows: 
Q (Mr. Swan) Can you establish the approx-
imate date of this conversation? 
THE COURT: The time you said you 
would analyze it. (The contract). 
A It was before-well, I can't say a definite 
date. I think it was when she-I told her 
about the time-I told her that if she 
wanted to take the responsibility, she 
would have to pay the penalty for doing 
it, if she went on her own judgment. 
Q (Mr. Swan) Now you didn't say that, 
though, Mr. Skeen. You said that if you 
couldn't cover it out of the loan you would 
have to get the money elsewhere. 
A To meet this, but I would expect her to pay 
me back. I wasn't making a gift of it. 
Q You mean eventually, when her situation 
permitted, she would reimburse you? 
A That is right. 
After no action had been taken on the payment 
of plaintiffs' bills, Mrs. Frehner made an appoint-
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ment for her husband to see Mr. Skeen at his law 
office in March, 1965, at which time according to 
Mr. Frehner's version, (Tr. 45) Mr. Skeen refused 
responsibility for the bill and instructed Mr. Frehner 
he would have to look to Margaret for payment. In 
Mr. Skeen's version of the conversation, he told Mr. 
Frehner that his bill far exceeded a reasonable 
amount (Tr. 250) and that he would not pay for 
it and also cautioned Mr. Frehner that no effort 
should be made to press Margaret for payment since 
she might lose her job at the University of Utah. 
(Tr. 251, 252) The cross-examination of Skeen on 
this conversation is illuminating: (Tr. 272): 
Q That was the first time-please respond 
to my question-that was the first time 
you ever told Mr. Frehner you would not 
be bound? 
A I have told you that three or four times. 
Q Until the presentation of these bills, you 
did not know what the details of this work 
was, I believe was the word you used? 
A That is right. 
Q You knew Frehner landscape gardening 
work was going on, on your premises? 
A I wouldn't say the landscaping-the tear-
ing down the hill and doing more damage 
than good. 
Q Whatever it was, he was doing it? 
A Well, he wouldn't have done it if I had 
control of it. I would have thrown him off. 
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Q The only reason you didn't, you didn't 
want to hurt Margaret? 
A Well, I have explained that two or three 
times. 
Q All right. I will accept your answer. 
'The day following the conversation between Mr. 
Frehner and Mr. Skeen in Skeen's office a lien was 
placed on the Summit Park property and shortly 
thereafter proceedings started to foreclose it. Mrs. 
Morton was killed August 27, 1965, (Tr. 244) dur-
ing the pendency of this action and at a pretrial 
conference the plaintiffs elected not to proceed 
against any possible estate of Mrs. Morton and con-
sented to the dismissal of the action as against her. 
The mountain home was traded during the pen-
dency of the action for property as 2067 Pheasant 
Circle in Salt Lake County, valued at $45,000 (Tr. 
275) Skeen paying to the other party, Arthur Over-
lade, Jr., the sum of $3,000.00 in cash (Tr. 274). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TYPE OF WORK PERFORMED AND IM-
PROVEMENTS MADE WERE LIENABLE UN-
DER THE UTAH CODE. 
Title 38-1-3 U. C. A. 1953 gives a lien to "Con-
tractors, sub-contractors, and all persons performing 
labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in, 
the construction or alteration of, or addition to, or 
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repair of, any building, structure, or improvement 
upon land .... " 
The test that would seem to govern under Utah 
law is that stated in the case of King Bros., Inc. vs. 
Utah Dry Kiln Company, Inc. 13 U. 2d 339, 374 P. 
2d 254, a case involving the application of the Utah 
Bond law. The court noted that the bond statute is 
closely related in purpose and the language used 
therein practically identical to that of the mechanics 
lien statute and observed that "the mechanics lien 
statutes were designed to prevent the landowner 
from taking the benefit of improvements placed on 
his property without paying for the labor and ma-
terials that went into it." The court sent back for 
trial a case that had been dismissed on defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment in the trial court 
for determination to be made whether furnaces, 
furnace casings, motorized fans, pipes and hoods 
furnished a dry kiln plant were, in fact, covered by 
the lien statute. This court gave a guide to the trial 
judge by stating: 
"The facts must be ascertained so that under 
the guidance of applicable principles of law, 
the correct determination can be made. In 
order to qualify under these statutes, it is nec-
essary that there be an annexation to the land, 
or to some permanent structure upon it, so 
that the materials in question can properly be 
regarded as having become a part of the realty, 
or a fixture appurtenant to it, and this must 
have been done with the intention of making it 
a permanent part thereof. That the addition 
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is consistent with the use to which the prop-
erty is put is often helpful in making the de-
termination.'' 
In the instant case, the trial court quoted ver-
batim from this Supreme Court decision in Instruc-
tion No. 9c. The jury has determined that part of 
the improvements which the Frehners made were 
"annexed to the land so that the materials in ques-
tion might properly be regarded as having become 
a part of the realty with the intent of making it a 
permanent part thereof." Such determination was 
made with respect to the hauling in of top soil, 
the sodding of the lawn area and the construction of 
a pool and waterfall. These were the major items 
of improvement. The jury found that part of the 
work performed by Mrs. Frehner was not lienable, 
and by reference to the worksheets of Mrs. Frehner 
the jury delineated between the items specified 
above and the cleaning up, the cutting of firewood 
and the hauling of trash. 
Defendants cite in their brief the case of Howe 
v. Meyers, 162 Pac. 1000 (Wash.). It may be seen 
from the footnote at 36 Am. Jur., Mechanic's Liens, 
Sec. 66 that the Supreme Court of Washington dis-
tinguished the facts in that case which involved the 
caring of an orchard from other cases which had sus-
tained liens for "planting a vineyard," "planting 
trees, shrubs and flowers," "planting an apple 
orchard," or "breaking and reducing wild lands to 
cultivation" for the reason that in such cases the 
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labor amounts "to a connected and completed oper-
ation, while work in cultivating and caring for an 
orchard is more or less intermittent, disconnected 
and seasonal." Clearly the items found by the jury 
in the instant case to be lienable were not inter-
mittent in character but were permanent improve-
ments to the real estate. 
The language at 36 Am. Jur., Mechanic's Liens, 
Sec. 66 indicates that courts have been divided on 
the question of mechanic's liens for filling, grading, 
terracing, sodding, fencing, and other like improve-
ments. A great deal depends upon the language used 
in the statute. There is respectable authority for 
plaintiffs view that the landscape construction in 
the instant case was lienable. As stated in 36 Am. 
Jur., Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 66, "It has been held 
that a lien for terracing and sodding a building lot 
is authorized under a statute providing that any-
one has a lien who shall perform labor or furnish 
materials to be used in altering or repairing 'any 
building or building lot including fences, sidewalks, 
paving, fountains, fish pond, fruit and ornamental 
trees.' " Further, "According to the one view, grad-
ing which is reasonably necessary to the proper con-
struction and occupation of a house may fairly be 
considered as part of the 'erection' within the 
meaning of the statute, and terracing and sodding 
as well as grading are within a statute giving a lien 
to any person who shall perform labor or service in 
altering or repairing any 'building or building lot.'" 
The same section goes on to state, "The furnishing 
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and planting of trees and shrubs, and the caring 
for the same for such a period of time as will insure 
that the seeds have become well started and that 
the plants and trees were thoroughly settled in the 
ground has been held to be an 'improvement' to 
the real estate within the meaning of a statute pro-
viding that 'any person who at the request of the re-
puted owner of any lot in any incorporated city or 
town, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves the 
same, has a lien upon said lot for his work done and 
materials furnished'." 
An annotation on this subject is found at 39 ALR 
2d 861 wherein the case of Green vs. Reese, 261 P. 
2d 596 (Okla., 1953) is noted. That case held that 
"the leveling and building up of certain vacant lots 
with tractor, bulldozer, and scraper, for the purpose 
of improving the land so that buildings could subse-
quently be erected thereon," was sufficient to consti-
tute a lienable item under the statute, the court 
apparently being of the opinion that such labor came 
within the meaning of the word "improvement" 
appearing therein. 
Likewise in Southwestern Electrical Company 
vs. Hughes, 30 P. 2d 114 (Kan., 1934) that court 
held that grading around a house and garage were 
lienable items. 
It would seem that under the broad language of 
the Utah code, to-wit; "improvement on land" such 
permanent improvements as landscape construction 
were clearly within the intent of the legislature. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS D. A. 
SKEEN AND BERTHA K. SKEEN ON THE LIA-
BILITY ISSUE. 
The defendants seem to have abandoned any ar-
gument that the defendants D. A. and Bertha K. 
Skeen were not personally liable as directed by the 
court for the reasonable value of the improvements 
made. Their brief argues only the lien question. 
The facts indicate an agency on the part of Mrs. 
Morton to proceed with the landscaping of the moun-
tain home. Mr. Skeen knew that Margaret was ne-
gotiating for landscaping to be done, he knew that 
she had consulted Frehner and, further, Skeen had 
agreed to provide the funds necessary to pay for 
the landscaping. It is difficult to imagine what 
additional authorization Margaret needed to proceed 
in behalf of the owners to complete the landscaping. 
By their pleadings in this case, the Skeens contended 
they knew nothing about the Frehners being on the 
property until after the entire landscape construc-
tion was completed and bills submitted. They denied 
that they gave any authorization for the work to be 
done. D. A. Skeen's testimony at the trial established 
the contrary. He knew that Margaret was going to 
talk to Frehner about the improvements; he wanted 
her to be happy in her choice; he did not interefere 
because it would amount to criticism of her judg-
ment; he knew she was extravagant but didn't want 
to hurt her feelings. It is no wonder that Margaret 
15 
obviously thought she had authorization from her 
father to proceed with the landscaping. The Skeens 
had it within their power from the commencement 
of the landscape construction to contact Frehners 
and tell them to get off their property. They made 
no contact with the Frehners until after the work 
was completed and then the meeting was at the in-
stance of Mrs. Frehner. 
It appears in this case that Mr. and Mrs. Frehn-
er thought they were dealing with the agent of an 
undisclosed principal. This does not relieve the prin-
cipal, however, from responsibility for the agent's 
contract. Once having determined the identity of 
the principal, the plaintiffs had a legal right to 
pursue that principal for the reasonable value of the 
improvements made. See 3 Am. Jur. 2d., Agency, 
Sec. 311. 
In defendants' brief so much is made of the 
"estoppel and ratification theories" of plaintiffs re-
covery that defendants have failed to comment on 
the reasons for the non-existence of an express or 
implied agency. It would seem that even under the 
estoppel or ratification theories, plaintiff should 
prevail. At 58 ALR 793 appears an annotation en-
titled "Estoppel-failure to disclose title." At Sec. 35 
it is stated: 
"It is the general rule in equity that where a 
person having rights and knowing those 
rights, sees another person take a mortgage 
upon property without disclosing his title, he 
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shall not be allowed afterwards to set up his 
title to defeat the mortgage. 
An analogous doctrine is applicable to cases 
involving the execution of deeds of trust; to 
cases in which a leasehold interest is created, 
and to cases in which contracts which may 
furnish a basis for claims under the mechan-
ic's lien laws are entered into." (emphasis 
added.) 
In Donaldson vs. Holmes, 23 Ill. 85 (1859) the 
holder of legal title was estopped from asserting it 
where he stood by and suffered the purchaser to 
enter into a contract for erection of a building, with-
out disclosing the fact that the latter did not own 
the lot and had made no payment on it. 
At 76 ALR 304 is found an annotation entitled 
"Estoppel by apparent acquiescence in or silence 
concerning improvements of real property to assert 
antagonistic title or interest." It is there stated: 
"It is said to be a very familiar rule of the 
law of estoppel that if the owner of an estate 
stands by and sees another erect improvements 
on the estate in the belief that he has a right 
to do so, and does not interpose to prevent the 
work, he will not be permitted to claim such 
improvements after they are erected." 
In the case of Burrow vs. Carley, 290 Pac. 577 
(Calif., 1930) the court stated, "An owner of prop-
erty may not stand by and see another erect im-
provements thereon in the belief that he has title to 
or interest in it and remain silent under circum-
17 
st~nces calling upon him to speak without thereby 
bemg estopped from claiming title to the property, 
at least without making compensation." 
Again quoting from our lien statute, Title 38-
1-3, the lien is given for "the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials furnished 
... whether at the instance of the owner or of any 
other person acting by his authority as his agent, 
contractor, or otherwise." It is submitted that the 
authority of such other person should be subject to 
proof the same as in non-lien situations; that is, by 
showing estoppel, ratification or any other circum-
stance which would bind the principal. At 36 Am. 
Jur., Mechanics Lien, Sec. 39 entitled "Estoppel of 
owner or mortgagee as against lien claimant," it is 
stated: 
"The owner or party liable for the improve-
ment may, on his part, be estopped from as-
serting a defense against the lien claimant. 
Thus, one having rights in the property, who, 
with knowledge of those rights sees persons 
entering into contracts which may furnish a 
basis for claims under the mechanic's lien law 
may be estopped to assert such rights." 
The cases cited by defendants in their brief can 
be distinguished from the facts here. Morrow vs. 
Merritt, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac. 667 (1898) involved 
a landlord-tenant situation in which the trial court 
had imposed a lien on the landlord's interest where 
he had not contracted for the materials or labor, the 
only evidence of authority being a provision in a 
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lease that the lessee would expend $2 ,5 00 in the 
erection of permanent improvements on the prem-
ises. In that case the Supreme Court did not have 
facts from which an estoppel or ratification could 
be found. In Belnap vs. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 97 
Pac. 111 (1903) the court had a vendor-vendee 
situation and cited the Morrow vs. Merritt case with 
approval. The court stated at page 113 of Pacific: 
"From the fore going it would seem that the 
person who can bind the owner's land for the 
things for which a lien is given must in some 
way obtain his authority to do so from the 
owner. Without such authority, express or 
implied, in the first instance, or subsequent 
ratification by the owner, the owner's prop-
erty is not bound, although the improvements 
may benefit his land." (emphasis added). 
The Court went on to state at page 114: 
"In this connection it is also insisted that the 
appellant is not limited by the terms of a 
written agreement which may bind the parties 
to it only, but that he may show any parol 
agreement between Mrs. Condon (vendor) 
and Mr. Becker ( vendee) from which the 
authority from her to him to purchase mater-
ials to improve the property may directly 
appear or be inferred. This contention in our 
judgment is sound. The real question involved 
in such case is to establish the relationship of 
principal and agent between the vendor and 
purchaser. If, therefore, the person furnishing 
material which is purchased for the improve-
ment of certain property can show that the 
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purchaser of the material was the agent of 
the real owner of the property, the agency 
ma¥ be establ~shed in such a case, precisely, 
as it may be m any other case. But the evi-
dence in such a case must establish agency. 
Without this there can be no authority in the 
person purchasing the material to bind the 
owner of the property, who is the principal." 
In the Belnap case such facts as would constitute 
a ratification did not exist. In the present case Mr. 
Skeen himself testified that he authorized Margaret 
to go ahead with landscaping, that he knew she was 
going to contact Frehner, but did nothing to dis-
courage her since it would impute her judgment. He 
had full knowledge of the facts when he was in-
formed by Brewer, the general contractor, that 
Frehner was on the property making improvements. 
His acceptance of those improvements and retention 
of benefits constitute a ratification of the agency. 
As stated at 3 Am. Jr. 2d. Agency, Sec 175: 
"It is an established principle of the law of 
agency that where a person acts for another 
who accepts or retains the benefits or proceeds 
of his efforts with knowledge of the material 
facts surrounding the transaction, such other 
must be deemed to have ratified the methods 
employed, as he may not, even though inno-
cent, receive or retain the benefits of, and at 
the same time disclaim responsibility for, the 
measures by which they were acquired." 
Sec. 178 states regarding acquiescence: 
"Whether there has been a ratification in a 
' 
I 
1; 
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particular case is ultimately and ordinarily a 
question of fact. Strictly speaking, therefore 
a failure to repudiate, or silence or acquies~ 
cence, after learning of an unauthorized act 
and in a case where the principal has an oppor-
tunity to repudiate or object to the act, does 
not of itself constitute ratification. Yet it is, 
if the one purporting to act as agent is not a 
mere stranger or intermeddler, cogent or 
prima facie evidence from which ratification 
may be inferred in the light of surrounding 
circumstances." 
Morrison vs. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac. 235 
( 1899) involved a married woman's interest in real 
estate sought to be charged with a lien for improve-
ments contracted solely by her husband. The fact 
situation can easily be distinguished from that in the 
instant case since in the Morrison case the wife dis-
agreed with her husband about constructing the 
house on the lot and wanted it erected on land in 
California and objected and protested against the 
building of the house on her land; he built the house 
against her objection and over her protest, and she 
never consented thereto. During all this time, and 
up to the completion of the house, she believed he 
was, and he was in fact, financially able to pay for 
the labor and materials so furnished. In that case 
the court at page. 237 of Pacific states that the wife 
might ratify the husband's contract or by conniving 
to conceal her ownership fraudulently mislead the 
contractor into the belief that her husband owns 
the land. The Morrison case had no such facts. In the 
instant case it can be determined that the failure 
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of the Skeens to inform Mr. Frehner that his im-
provements were not desired on their property 
amounted to a concealment of their ownership and 
misled Frehner into the belief that Margaret Morton 
owned the land. 
It is submitted that the instant case is more 
nearly like Buehner Block Company vs. Glezos, 6 
U. 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517 where this court de-
termined that a lessee's interest in certain property 
was subject to a lien for improvements where the 
improvements were ordered made by one who was 
not the lessee, but an alleged partner of the lessee. 
In that case the court had to find a partnership 
(agency) which agency was found on the basis of 
Glezos consenting to another's representing him to 
third parties as a partner and those third parties 
had on the faith thereof advanced materials, money 
or credit to the partnership. The court stated that 
Glezos was liable "even though as between them 
(the alleged partners) no real partnership exists." 
This was a finding of partnership (agency) by 
estoppel. In the instant case Mr. Skeen allowed his 
daughter to proceed as though she were authorized 
to order the materials and labor which resulted in 
improvements to the Skeen property. By inference 
he consented to Margaret's representing herself as 
having authority to contract for the improvements. 
Skeen did, in fact, pay for the construction costs on 
the mountain home until the money ran out, at which 
time he refused to make payment on the landscape 
construction bill. In the instant case an agency 
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existed, either express or implied. At the very least 
an agency by estoppel or ratification, existed which 
subjected the Skeens' interest in the real estate to 
a lien for improvements for which they did not 
directly contract. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AP-
PELLANTS' M 0 TI 0 N FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF RESPON-
DENTS' CASE. 
At the close of plaintiffs' case the evidence con-
cerning Mr. Skeen's knowledge of Mr. Frehner's 
being upon the premises and of proceeding with 
work which Margaret had contracted for was lim-
ited to the testimony of the general contractor, 
Brewer, who stated that he had talked with Mr. 
Skeen shortly after Frehner commenced the land-
scape work and told him that Frehner was on the 
property and that he (Skeen) should be concerned 
because he might have to pay more than he should 
for the improvements. When Mr. Skeen, took the 
stand in his own behalf, he added to this testimony 
substantially. It was his own testimony which es-
tablished the conversations between Margaret and 
him on which Margaret's authority to proceed with 
this work can be based. It should be remembered 
that Margaret was dead at the time of the trial and 
it was impossible to introduce any evidence as to 
the exact relationship between them except through 
Mr. Skeen. It is submitted that there was some evi-
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dence of an agency, or at least an estoppel or rati-
fication, at the close of plaintiffs' case and when 
defendant Skeen, took the stand he removed all 
doubt. 
Where the defendants' motion for directed ver-
dict at the close of the plaintiffs' case is denied and 
defendant thereupon presents his own evidence, the 
defendant has been held to have waived any error 
in the denial of the motion for directed verdict. 
Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada vs. Oli-
ver P. Cummings, 27 L. Ed. 266; see also Newman 
vs. Brengle, 250 F. 2d 660 and numerous other 
cases annotated at 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 50, Section 15 
"Waiver." 
CROSS-APPEAL 
Plaintiffs hereby cross-appeal from the trial 
court's order that the attorney's fee as awarded by 
the jury be modified downward. Plaintiffs further 
ask for an attorney's fee to reimburse them for fees 
incurred by them on this appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REDUCING THE AT-
TORNEY'S FEE AWARDED BY THE JURY. 
Testimony of plaintiffs' counsel given on the 
second day of a three day trial was to the effect that 
a reasonable fee based upon time expended, plead-
ings drafted, memoranda to the court prepared, 
motions and pretrials attended and days in actual 
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trial up to that time was the sum of $970.00, but 
that in view of the total amount involved in the 
controversy counsel felt that he would only ask for 
$750.00. Another full day of trial ensued after this 
testimony of plaintiffs' counsel. The jury, upon 
instruction as to what they might consider in de-
termining the reasonableness of plaintiffs' attorney's 
fees (see Instruction No. 9-D) returned a verdict 
of $750.00. 
On the hearing of defendants' motion for a new 
trial and defendants' motion to set aside the verdict 
and judgment thereon and for a directed verdict, 
the trial court required plaintiff to submit to a re-
duction of the attorney's fee to one-half of the total 
amount of recovery determined as being subject to 
a lien. The trial court apparently determined that 
under no conditions could an attorney's fee exceed 
50 per cent of the claim upon which recovery was 
based. 
Title 38-1-18 UCA 1953 states as follows: 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful parties shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in this action. 
It may be argued that the matter of attorney's 
fees was improperly submitted to the jury in this 
case and that it is the sole prerogative of the court 
to fix fees. The statute could be interpreted, how-
ever, as giving to the "finder of fact" the right to 
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fix the attorney's fee, in which case it would prop-
erly be a jury function in a jury case. Plaintiffs are 
not as much concerned with who fixes the fee as 
the general proposition that they are limited to 50 
per cent of the recovery. 
At the first pretrial hearing counsel actually 
stipulated as to what would be reasonable (R. 16) 
and agreed on the bar fee schedule (which would be 
$311.12 on $1,018.61) plus $150.00 for each day of 
trial after the first. Since the trial lasted three full 
days the total fee under this formula would be 
$611.12. But at a subsequent pretrial the trial court 
allowed plaintiffs' counsel to withdraw from the 
stipulation (R.30) and framed an issue for trial on 
"what is a reasonable attorney's fee." It was ap-
parent to plaintiffs' counsel at this stage of the pro-
ceedings that the actual fee which would be incurred 
in this trial would far exceed the amount set forth 
in the stipulation. 
The question of attorney's fees in lien matters 
has produced about as many results as there are 
cases. What was a reasonable fee in 1950 may not 
be reasonable in 1966, due to the reduced buying 
power of the dollar. Courts have sought some mid-
dle ground in the matter as is evidenced by the fol-
lowing from Davis vs. Altose, 35 Wash. 2d. 807, 
215 P. 2d. 705 (1950): 
"It is of the utmost importance to litigants 
that a reasonable attorney's fee be fixed by the 
court which will, as nearly as can be done, 
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adequately compensate the lien claimant's 
counsel for services necessarily rendered in 
the case and at the same time not unduly bur-
den the property owner with the payment 
which he must make, in addition to the amount 
of the lien in order to discharge his property 
from the judgment." 
It is submitted that if one element of this formula 
should be given greater weight, it would be the ade-
quate compensation of the lien claimant's counsel, 
if successful, for his theory of the case has won the 
approval of the court or jury. Each party runs the 
risk of paying the other party's attorney's fees. The 
statute is worded so that if plaintiffs had lost, they 
would have been subjected to payment of defendants' 
attorney fees. 
In Hopkins vs. Ulvestad 46 Wash. 2d. 514, 282 
P. 2d. 806 (1955) the trial court awarded $150.00 
attorney's fees in an action where $173.70 was re-
covered. On appeal the lien claim was increased to 
$721.28 and the court increased the trial court fee to 
$300.00. The Supreme Court refused to fix the 
amount of the attorney's fees earned on the appeal, 
but indicated that the trial court might do so at any 
time. 
POINT V 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN 
ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR THIS 
APPEAL. 
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Our statute provides for an attorney's fee "in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter." Obviously the judgment of the trial court 
cannot result in enforcement of the lien, when, as 
here, an appeal is taken and supersedeas bond filed 
to prevent execution. The resistance of the appeal, 
therefore, in the most real sense, is part of "enforc-
ing the lien.'' 
Many courts have awarded attorney's fees in-
curred on appeals in lien cases. See 56 ALR 2d 114. 
In Haskett vs. Turner, 290 P. 2d. 133 (Okla., 1955) 
the reviewing court awarded an additional attorney's 
fee on an appeal of $250.00. In Welfare Federation 
Act Committee of 1,000 vs. Richardson, 281 P. 2d. 
428 (Okla.) the judgment for an increased fee of 
$425.00 on appeal was rendered on the supersedeas 
bond. This case was one for wages under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act but the precedent was followed 
in the Haskett case, a lien action previously cited. 
In Davis vs. Altose, op. cit., a principal recovery 
of $938. 77 was effected and the Supreme Court 
ordered a reduction of the attorney's fee from 
$800.00 to $650.00. In that case the total allowed by 
the trial court was in anticipation of an appeal and 
would have been 80 per cent of the total recovery 
( $400.00 for the trial and $400.00 for the appeal.) 
The appellate court approved a combined fee for the 
trial and the appeal totaling 69.2 per cent. 
The advisory Handbook on Fees of the Utah 
State Bar proposes a fee of $500.00 for representing 
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either appellant or respondent in the Supreme Court 
of Utah (p. 23). Such is a reasonable fee to be 
awarded plaintiffs on this appeal, whether fixed by 
the Supreme Court, or after remittitur, by the Dis-
trict Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly directed a verdict on 
both the liability of the Skeens and the validity of 
the lien. The jury determined the amounts under 
proper instructions. This court should affirm the 
judgment on the verdict and indicate the disposition 
of the attorney's fee question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Allen M. Swan 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
428 American Oil Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
